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1. Introduction  
Natural language has features that are not found in logically perfect artificial languages. 
One such feature is redundancy, where two or more terms/expressions share exactly the 
same semantic and logical (but perhaps not pragmatic or rhetoric) properties. Another 
feature is its converse, namely ambiguity, where one term/expression has more than one 
meaning. A logical analysis of such a piece of natural language will typically translate each 
of its unambiguous meanings into logically perfect notation. Frege’s Begriffsschrift was the 
first major attempt in modern logic to create such a notation (though he primarily intended 
it for mathematical language).1 There are various origins and various manifestations of 
ambiguity, not least cases bearing on quantifier scopes, like “Every boy dances with one 
girl”. Another sort of example is “John loves his wife, and so does Peter”, which is 
ambiguous between Peter loving John’s wife and Peter loving his own wife, because it is 
ambiguous which property ‘so’ picks up.2 A third, and perhaps less-noticed, sort of 
ambiguity is pivoted on whether the topic or the focus of a sentence is highlighted. For 
instance, “John only introduced Bill to Sue”, to use Hajičová’s example,3 lends itself to two 
different kinds of construal: “John did not introduce other people to Sue except for Bill” and 
“The only person Bill was introduced to by John was Sue”. There are two sentences whose 
semantics, logical properties and consequences only partially overlap. A similar 
phenomenon also crops up in the case of propositional attitudes and their less-attended 
‘cousins’ of notional attitudes like seeking and finding, calculating and proving.   
In this chapter I will deal in particular with ambiguities in natural language exemplifying 
the difference between topic and focus articulation within a sentence. This difference is closely 
related to the disambiguation stemming from supposition de dicto and de re with which a 
particular expression is used. I will show that whereas articulating the topic of a sentence 
activates a presupposition, articulating the focus frequently yields merely entailment. Based 
on an analysis of topic-focus articulation, I propose a solution to the almost hundred-year 
old dispute over Strawsonian vs. Russellian definite descriptions.4 The point of departure is 
                                                 
1 See (Frege, 1884). 
2 See (Neale, 2004), and also (Duží &  Jespersen, submitted). 
3 See (Hajičová, 2008). 
4 See, for instance, (Donellan, 1966); (Fintel, 2004); (Neale 1990); (Russell, 1905, 1957); (Strawson 1950, 
1964).  
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that sentences of the form “The F is a G” are ambiguous. Their ambiguity is, in my view, not 
rooted in a shift of meaning of the definite description ‘the F’. Rather, the ambiguity stems 
from different topic-focus articulations of such sentences. Russell and Strawson took 
themselves to be at loggerheads; whereas, in fact, they spoke at cross purposes. The received 
view still tends to be that there is room for at most one of the two positions, since they are 
deemed incompatible. And they are, of course, incompatible – if they must explain the same 
set of data. But they should not, in my view. One theory is excellent at explaining one set of 
data, but poor at explaining the data that the other theory is excellent at explaining; and vice 
versa. My novel contribution advances the research into definite descriptions by pointing out 
how progress has been hampered by a false dilemma and how to move beyond that dilemma. 
The point is this. If ‘the F’ is the topic phrase then this description occurs with de re 
supposition and Strawson’s analysis appears to be what is wanted. On this reading the 
sentence presupposes the existence of the descriptum of ‘the F’. The other option is ‘G’ 
occurring as topic and ‘the F’ as focus. This reading corresponds to Donnellan’s attributive 
use of ‘the F’ and the description occurs with de dicto supposition. On this reading the 
Russellian analysis gets the truth-conditions of the sentence right. The existence of a unique 
F is merely entailed.  
Ancillary to my analysis is a general analytic schema of sentences coming with a 
presupposition. This analysis makes use of a definition of the ‘if-then-else’ connective known 
from programming languages. A broadly accepted view of the semantic nature of this 
connective is that it is a so-called non-strict function that does not comply with the principle 
of compositionality. However, the semantic nature of the connective is contested among 
computer scientists. I will show  and this is also a novel contribution of mine  that there 
is no cogent reason for embracing a non-strict definition and context-dependent meaning, 
provided a higher-order logic making it possible to operate on hyperintensions is applied. 
The framework of Tichý’s Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL) possesses sufficient 
expressive power, and will figure as background theory throughout my exposition.5  
Tichý’s TIL was developed simultaneously with Montague’s Intensional Logic, IL.6 The 
technical tools of disambiguation will be familiar from IL, with two exceptions. One is that 
we -bind separate variables w, w1, …, wn ranging over possible worlds and t, t1, …, tn 
ranging over times. This dual binding is tantamount to explicit intensionalization and 
temporalization. The other exception is that functional application is the logic both of 
extensionalization of intensions (functions from possible worlds) and of predication.7 
Application is symbolized by square brackets, ‘…’. Intensions are extensionalized by 
applying them to worlds and times, as in [[Intension w] t], abbreviated by subscripted terms 
for world and time variables: Intensionwt is the extension of the generic intension Intension at 
w, t. Thus, for instance, the extensionalization of a property yields a set (possibly an empty 
one), and the extensionalization of a proposition yields a truth-value (or no value at all). A 
general objection to Montague’s IL is that it fails to accommodate hyperintensionality, as 
indeed any formal logic interpreted set-theoretically is bound to unless a domain of 
primitive hyperintensions is added to the frame. Any theory of natural-language analysis 
needs a hyperintensional (preferably procedural) semantics in order to crack the hard nuts 
                                                 
5 For details on TIL see, in particular, (Duží et al., 2010a); (Tichý, 1988, 2004). 
6 For a detailed critical comparison of TIL and Montague’s IL, see (Duží et al., 2010a, § 2.4.3); 
7 For details, see (Jespersen, 2008). 
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of natural language semantics. In global terms, without procedural semantics TIL is an anti-
contextualist (i.e., transparent), explicitly intensional modification of IL. With procedural 
semantics, TIL rises above the model-theoretic paradigm and joins instead the paradigm of 
hyperintensional logic and structured meanings. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2 I briefly summarise the history of the 
dispute between Russell and Strawson (as well as their proponents and opponents) on the 
semantic character of sentences containing definite descriptions. Section 3 is an introduction 
to TIL. In paragraph 3.1 I introduce the semantic foundations of TIL and in 3.2 its logical 
foundations. Sections 4 and 5 contain the main results of this study. In Section 4 I propose a 
solution to the dispute over Strawsonian vs. Russellian definite descriptions. Paragraph 4.1 
is an introduction to the problem of ambiguities stemming from different topic-focus 
articulation and a solution based on this distinction is proposed in paragraph 4.2. Section 5 
generalizes the method of topic-focus disambiguation to sentences containing not only 
definite descriptions but also general terms occurring with different suppositions. To this 
end I make use of the strict analysis of the if-then-else function that is defined in paragraph 
5.1. The method is then illustrated by analysing some more examples in paragraph 5.2. 
Finally, Section 6 summarizes the results.   
2. Russell vs. Strawson on definite descriptions 
There is a substantial difference between proper names and definite descriptions. This 
distinction is of crucial importance due to their vastly different logical behaviour. 
Independently of any particular theory of proper names, it should be granted that a proper 
proper name (as opposed to a definite description grammatically masquerading as a proper 
name) is a rigid designator of a numerically particular individual. On the other hand, a 
definite description like, for instance, ‘the Mayor of Dunedin’, ‘the King of France’, ‘the 
highest mountain on Earth’, etc., offers an empirical criterion that enables us to establish 
which individual, if any, satisfies the criterion in a particular state of affairs. 
The contemporary discussion of the distinction between names and descriptions was 
triggered by Russell (1905). Russell’s key idea is the proposal that a sentence like 
(1) “The F is a G”, containing a definite description ‘the F’ is understood to have, in the 
final analysis, the logical form  
(1′) x (Fx  y (Fy  x=y)  Gx), rather than the logical form G(x Fx).  
Though Russell’s quantificational theory remains to this day a strong rival of referential 
theories, it has received its fair share of criticism. First, Russell’s translation of simple 
sentences like “The F is a G” into the molecular form “There is at least one F and at most one 
thing is an F and that thing is a G” is rather enigmatic, because Russell disregards the 
standard constraint that there must be a fair amount of structural similarity between 
analysandum and analysans. Second, Russell proposed the elimination of Peano’s 
descriptive operator ‘’ understood as ‘the only’, and deprived definite descriptions of their 
self-contained meaning. Third, Russell simply got the truth-conditions wrong in important 
cases of using descriptions when there is no such thing as the unique F. This criticism was 
launched by Strawson who in (1950) objected that Russell's theory predicts the wrong truth-
conditions for sentences like ‘The present King of France is bald’. According to Russell’s 
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analysis, this sentence is false, but according to Strawson, this outcome does not conform to 
our intuitions about its truth or falsity. In Strawson’s view, the sentence can be neither true 
nor false whenever there is no King of France. Obviously, in such a state of affairs the 
sentence is not true. However, if it were false then its negation, “The King of France is not 
bald”, would be true, which entails that there is a unique King of France, contrary to the 
assumption that there is none. Strawson held that sentences like these not only entail the 
existence of the present King of France, but also presuppose his existence. If ‘the present King 
of France’ fails to refer, then the presupposition is false and the sentence fails to have a 
determinate truth value.8 
Russell (1957) in response to Strawson’s criticism argued that, despite Strawson’s protests, 
the sentence was in fact false: 
Suppose, for example, that in some country there was a law that no person could 
hold public office if he considered it false that the Ruler of the Universe is wise. I 
think an avowed atheist who took advantage of Mr. Strawson’s doctrine to say that 
he did not hold this proposition false would be regarded as a somewhat shifty 
character.  (Russell, 1957) 
Donnellan (1966) observed that there is a sense in which Strawson and Russell are both right 
(and both wrong) about the proper analysis of definite descriptions, because definite 
descriptions can be used in two different ways. On a so-called attributive use, a sentence of 
the form ‘The F is a G’ is used to express a proposition equivalent to ‘Whatever is uniquely F 
is a G’. Alternatively, on a referential use, a sentence of the form ‘The F is a G’ is used to pick 
out a specific individual, a, and to say of a that a is a G. Donnellan suggested that Russell’s 
quantificational account of definite descriptions might capture attributive uses, but that it 
does not work for referential uses. Ludlow in (2007) interprets Donnellan as arguing that in 
some cases descriptions are Russellian and in other cases they are Strawsonian.  
Kripke (1977) responded to Donnellan by arguing that the Russellian account of definite 
descriptions could, by itself, account for both referential and attributive uses, and that the 
difference between the two cases could be entirely a matter of pragmatics, because there is 
an important distinction between what one literally says by an utterance and what one 
intends to communicate by that utterance. Neale (1990) supported Russell’s view by 
collecting a number of previously observed cases in which intuitions about truth conditions 
clearly do not support Strawson’s view. On the other hand, a number of linguists have 
recently come to Strawson’s defence on this matter. For a detailed survey of the arguments 
supporting Strawson’s view and also arguments supporting Russell’s, see (Ludlow, 2007). 
Here it might suffice to say that Strawson’s concerns have not delivered a knock-out blow to 
Russell’s theory of descriptions, and so this topic remains very much alive. Recently, von 
Fintel in (2004) argues that every sentence containing a definite description ‘the F’ comes 
with the existential presupposition that there be a unique F. For instance, he argues against 
the standpoint that the sentence “Last week, my friend went for a drive with the king of 
France” is false. He claims that this sentence presupposes that there be a king of France and 
that in the technical sense the sentence has no truth-value.  
                                                 
8 Nevertheless, for Strawson, sentences are meaningful in and of themselves, independently of the 
empirical facts like contingent non-existence of the King of France.  
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In this chapter I am not going to take into account Kripke’s pragmatic factors like the 
intentions of a speaker. In other words, I am not going to take into account what a speaker 
might have meant by his/her utterance, for this is irrelevant to a logical semantic theory. So I 
am disregarding Donnellan’s troublesome notion of having somebody in mind. Instead, I 
will propose a literal semantic analysis of sentences of the form “The F is a G”. What I want to 
show is this. First, definite descriptions are not deprived of a self-contained meaning and 
they denote one and the same entity in any context. Thus they are never Russellian. Second, 
Russell’s insight that a definite description ‘the F’ does not denote a definite individual is 
spot-on. Rather, according to TIL, ‘the F’ denotes a condition to be contingently satisfied by 
the individual (if any) that happens to be the F. I will explicate such conditions in terms of 
possible-world intensions, viz. as individual roles or offices to be occupied by at most one 
individual per world/time pair. Third, I am going to show that Donnellan was right that 
sentences of the form “The F is a G” are ambiguous. However, their ambiguity does not 
concern a shift of meaning of the definite description ‘the F’. Rather, the ambiguity concerns 
different topic-focus articulations of these sentences. There are two options. The description 
‘the F’ may occur in the topic of a sentence and property G (the focus) is predicated of the 
topic. This case corresponds to Donnellan’s referential use; using medieval terminology I will 
say that ‘the F’ occurs with de re supposition.  The other option is ‘G’ occurring as topic and 
‘the F’ as focus. This reading corresponds to Donnellan’s attributive use of ‘the F’ and the 
description occurs with de dicto supposition. Consequently, such sentences are ambiguous 
between their de dicto and de re readings. On their de re reading they presuppose the existence 
of a unique F. Thus Strawson’s analysis appears to be adequate for de re cases. On their de 
dicto reading they have the truth-conditions as specified by the Russellian analysis. They do 
not presuppose, but only entail, the existence of a unique F. However, the Russellian 
analysis, though being equivalent to the one I am going to propose, is not an adequate literal 
analysis of de dicto readings. 
I am going to bring out the semantic nature of the topic-focus difference by means of a logical 
analysis. As a result, I will furnish sentences differing only in their topic-focus articulation 
with different structured meanings producing different possible-world propositions.9 
Moreover, the proposed solution of the problem of definite descriptions generalizes to any 
sentences differing in their topic-focus articulation. Thus I am going to introduce a general 
analytic schema of sentences that come with a presupposition. Since our logic is a 
hyperintensional logic of partial functions, I am able to analyse sentences with 
presuppositions in a natural way. It means that I furnish them with hyperpropositions, viz. 
procedures that produce partial possible-world propositions, which occasionally yield truth-
value gaps. 10 
3. Foundations of TIL 
TIL is an overarching semantic theory for all sorts of discourse, whether colloquial, 
scientific, mathematical or logical. The theory is a procedural (as opposed to denotational) 
one, according to which sense is an abstract, extra-linguistic procedure detailing what 
operations to apply to what procedural constituents to arrive at the product (if any) of the 
                                                 
9 For details on structured meanings, see (Duží, et al., 2010b).  
10 For an introduction to the notion of hyperproposition, see (Jespersen, 2010). 
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procedure. Such procedures are rigorously defined as TIL constructions. The semantics is 
tailored to the hardest case, as constituted by hyperintensional contexts, and generalized 
from there to simpler intensional and extensional contexts. This entirely anti-contextual and 
compositional semantics is, to the best of my knowledge, the only one that deals with all 
kinds of context in a uniform way. Thus we can characterize TIL as an extensional logic of 
hyperintensions.11 The sense of an empirical sentence is an algorithmically structured 
construction of the proposition denoted by the sentence. The denoted proposition is a flat, or 
unstructured, mapping with domain in a logical space of possible worlds. Our motive for 
working ‘top-down’ has to do with anti-contextualism: any given unambiguous term or 
expression (even one involving indexicals or anaphoric pronouns) expresses the same 
construction as its sense whatever sort of context the term or expression is embedded 
within. And the meaning of an expression determines the respective denoted entity (if any), 
but not vice versa. The denoted entities are (possibly 0-ary) functions understood as set-
theoretical mappings. Thus we strictly distinguish between a procedure (construction) and 
its product (here, a constructed function), and between a function and its value. What makes 
TIL suitable for the job of disambiguation is the fact that the theory construes the semantic 
properties of the sense and denotation relations as remaining invariant across different sorts 
of linguistic contexts.12 Thus logical analysis disambiguates ambiguous expressions in such 
a way that an ambiguous expression is furnished with more than one context-invariant 
meaning that is TIL construction. However, logical analysis cannot dictate which 
disambiguation is the intended one. It falls to pragmatics to select the intended one.  
3.1 Semantic foundations of TIL 
The context-invariant semantics of TIL is obtained by universalizing Frege’s reference-
shifting semantics custom-made for ‘indirect’ contexts.13 The upshot is that it becomes 
trivially true that all contexts are transparent, in the sense that pairs of terms that are co-
denoting outside an indirect context remain co-denoting inside an indirect context and vice 
versa. In particular, definite descriptions that only contingently describe the same individual 
never qualify as co-denoting.14 Our term for the extra-semantic, factual relation of 
contingently describing the same entity is ‘reference’, whereas ‘denotation’ stands for the 
intra-semantic, pre-factual relation between two words that pick out the same entity at the 
same world/time-pairs. 
The syntax of TIL is Church’s (higher-order) typed -calculus, but with the all-important 
difference that the syntax has been assigned a procedural (as opposed to denotational) 
semantics. Thus, abstraction transforms into the molecular procedure of forming a 
function, application into the molecular procedure of applying a function to an argument, 
and variables into atomic procedures for arriving at their values. Furthermore, TIL 
constructions represent our interpretation of Frege’s notion of Sinn (with the exception 
that constructions are not truth-bearers; instead some present either truth-values or truth-
conditions) and are kindred to Church’s notion of concept. Constructions are linguistic 
                                                 
11 For the most recent application, see (Duží & Jespersen, fothcoming).  
12 Indexicals being the only exception: while the sense of an indexical remains constant, its denotation 
varies in keeping with its contextual embedding. See (Duží et al., 2010a, § 3.4). 
13 See (Frege, 1892). 
14 See Definition 7. 
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senses as well as modes of presentation of objects and are our hyperintensions. While the 
Frege-Church connection makes it obvious that constructions are not formulae, it is 
crucial to emphasize that constructions are not functions(-in-extension), either. They 
might be explicated as Church’s ‘functions-in-intension’, but we do not use the term 
’function-in-intension’, because Church did no define it (he only characterized functions-
in-intension as rules for presenting functions-in-extension). Rather, technically speaking, 
some constructions are modes of presentation of functions, including 0-place functions 
such as individuals and truth-values, and the rest are modes of presentation of other 
constructions. Thus, with constructions of constructions, constructions of functions, 
functions, and functional values in our stratified ontology, we need to keep track of the 
traffic between multiple logical strata. The ramified type hierarchy does just that. What is 
important about this traffic is, first of all, that constructions may themselves figure as 
functional arguments or values. Thus we consequently need constructions of one order 
higher in order to present those being arguments or values of functions. With both 
hyperintensions and possible-world intensions in its ontology, TIL has no trouble 
assigning either hyperintensions or intensions to variables as their values. However, the 
technical challenge of operating on constructions requires two (occasionally three) 
interrelated, non-standard devices. The first is Trivialization, which is an atomic 
construction, whose only constituent part is itself. The second is the function Sub (for 
‘substitution’). (The third is the function Tr (for ‘Trivialization’), which takes an object to 
its Trivialization.) We say that Trivialization is used to mention other constructions.15 The 
point of mentioning a construction is to make it, rather than what it presents, a functional 
argument. Hence for a construction to be mentioned is for it to be Trivialized; in this way 
the context is raised up to a hyperintensional level.   
Our neo-Fregean semantic schema, which applies to all contexts, is this triangulation:  
 
 
  Expression  Construction     Denotation 
               expresses           constructs  
denotes              
Fig. 1. TIL semantic schema. 
The most important relation in this schema is between an expression and its meaning, i.e., a 
construction. Once constructions have been defined, we can logically examine them; we can 
investigate a priori what (if anything) a construction constructs and what is entailed by it. 
Thus meanings/constructions are semantically primary, denotations secondary, because an 
expression denotes an object (if any) via its meaning that is a construction expressed by the 
expression. Once a construction is explicitly given as a result of logical analysis, the entity (if 
any) it constructs is already implicitly given. As a limiting case, the logical analysis may 
reveal that the construction fails to construct anything by being improper.  
                                                 
15 The use/mention distinction normally applies only to words; in TIL it applies to the meanings of words 
(i.e., constructions). See (Duží, et al., 2010a, §2.6). In theory, a construction may be mentioned by 
another construction than Trivialization; but in this chapter we limit ourselves to Trivialization.  
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3.2 Logical foundations of TIL 
In this section we set out the definitions of first-order types (regimented by a simple type 
theory), constructions, and higher-order types (regimented by a ramified type hierarchy), 
which taken together form the nucleus of TIL, accompanied by some auxiliary  
definitions.  
The type of first-order object includes all objects that are not constructions. Therefore, it 
includes not only the standard objects of individuals, truth-values, sets, etc., but also 
functions defined on possible worlds (i.e., the intensions germane to possible-world 
semantics). Sets, for their part, are always characteristic functions and insofar extensional 
entities. But the domain of a set may be typed over higher-order objects, in which case the 
relevant set is itself a higher-order object. Similarly for other functions, including relations, 
with domain or range in constructions. That is, whenever constructions are involved, we 
find ourselves in the ramified type hierarchy.16 The definition of the ramified hierarchy of 
types decomposes into three parts: firstly, simple types of order 1; secondly, constructions of 
order n; thirdly, types of order n + 1. 
Definition 1 (types of order 1). Let B be a base, where a base is a collection of pair-wise 
disjoint, non-empty sets. Then: 
i. Every member of B is an elementary type of order 1 over B. 
ii. Let ǂ, ǃ1, ..., ǃm (m > 0) be types of order 1 over B. Then the collection  
(ǂ ǃ1 ... ǃm) of all m-ary partial mappings from ǃ1  ...  ǃm into ǂ is a functional type of 
order 1 over B. 
Nothing is a type of order 1 over B unless it so follows from (i) and (ii). 
Definition 2 (construction) 
i. The Variable x is a construction that constructs an object X of the respective type 
dependently on a valuation v; x v-constructs X. 
ii. Trivialization: Where X is an object whatsoever (an extension, an intension or a 
construction), 0X is the construction Trivialization. It constructs X without any change. 
iii. The Composition [X Y1…Ym] is the following construction. If X v-constructs a function f of 
a type (ǂǃ1…ǃm), and Y1, …, Ym v-construct entities B1, …, Bm of types ǃ1, …, ǃm, 
respectively, then the Composition [X Y1…Ym] v-constructs the value (an entity, if any, of 
type ǂ) of f on the tuple-argument B1, …, Bm. Otherwise the Composition [X Y1…Ym] 
does not v-construct anything and so is v-improper. 
iv. The Closure [λx1…xm Y] is the following construction. Let x1, x2, …, xm be pair-wise 
distinct variables v-constructing entities of types ǃ1, …, ǃm and Y a construction v-
constructing an ǂ-entity. Then [λx1 … xm Y] is the construction λ-Closure (or Closure). It v-
constructs the following function f of the type (ǂǃ1…ǃm). Let v(B1/x1,…,Bm/xm) be a 
valuation identical with v at least up to assigning objects B1/ǃ1, …, Bm/ǃm to variables 
x1, …, xm. If Y is v(B1/x1,…,Bm/xm)-improper (see iii), then f is undefined on the 
argument B1, …, Bm. Otherwise the value of f on B1, …, Bm is the ǂ-entity 
v(B1/x1,…,Bm/xm)-constructed by Y. 
                                                 
16 Attempting to type constructions within the simple type theory (as though constructions were first-
order objects) is the source of some misconceptions of TIL found in (Daley 2010).  
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v. The Single Execution 1X is the construction that either v-constructs the entity v-
constructed by X or, if X v-constructs nothing, is v-improper (yielding nothing relative to 
v). 
vi. The Double Execution 2X is the following construction. Where X is any entity, the Double 
Execution 2X is v-improper (yielding nothing relative to v) if X is not itself a construction, 
or if X does not v-construct a construction, or if X v-constructs a v-improper 
construction. Otherwise, let X v-construct a construction Y and Y v-construct an entity 
Z: then 2X v-constructs Z. 
Nothing is a construction, unless it so follows from (i) through (vi). 
Definition 3 (ramified hierarchy of types) 
T1 (types of order 1). See Definition 1.  
Cn (constructions of order n)  
i. Let x be a variable ranging over a type of order n. Then x is a construction of order n over 
B. 
ii. Let X be a member of a type of order n. Then 0X, 1X, 2X are constructions of order n over B.  
iii. Let X, X1,..., Xm (m > 0) be constructions of order n over B. Then [X X1... Xm] is a 
construction of order n over B. 
iv. Let x1,...xm, X (m > 0) be constructions of order n over B. Then [x1...xm X] is a 
construction of order n over B. 
v. Nothing is a construction of order n over B unless it so follows from Cn (i)-(iv).   
Tn+1 (types of order n + 1). Let n be the collection of all constructions of order n over B. Then 
i. n and every type of order n are types of order n + 1.  
ii. If 0 < m and , 1,...,m are types of order n + 1 over B, then ( 1 ... m)  
(see T1 ii)) is a type of order n + 1 over B. 
Nothing is a type of order n + 1 over B unless it so follows from Tn+1 (i) and (ii). 
Remark. For the purposes of natural-language analysis, we are currently assuming the 
following base of ground types, which is part of the ontological commitments of TIL: 
ο: the set of truth-values {T, F}; 
ι:  the set of individuals (the universe of discourse); 
τ:  the set of real numbers (doubling as discrete times); 
ω:  the set of logically possible worlds (the logical space).  
Empirical languages incorporate an element of contingency, because they denote empirical 
conditions that may or may not be satisfied at some world/time pair of evaluation. Non-
empirical languages (in particular the language of mathematics) have no need for an 
additional category of expressions for empirical conditions. We model these empirical 
conditions as possible-world intensions. They are entities of type (): mappings from possible 
worlds to an arbitrary type . The type  is frequently the type of the chronology of -objects, 
i.e., a mapping of type (). Thus -intensions are frequently functions of type (()), 
abbreviated as ‘’. Extensional entities are entities of a type  where   () for any type . 
Examples of frequently used intensions are: propositions of type , properties of individuals of 
type (), binary relations-in-intension between individuals of type (), individual 
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offices/roles of type . Our explicit intensionalization and temporalization enables us to encode 
constructions of possible-world intensions, by means of terms for possible-world variables 
and times, directly in the logical syntax. Where variable w ranges over possible worlds (type 
) and t over times (type ), the following logical form essentially characterizes the logical 
syntax of any empirical language: wt […w….t…]. Where  is the type of the object v-
constructed by […w….t…], by abstracting over the values of variables w and t we construct 
a function from worlds to a partial function from times to , that is a function of type 
((τ)), or ‘τ’ for short. 
Logical objects like truth-functions and quantifiers are extensional:  (conjunction),  
(disjunction) and  (implication) of type (), and  (negation) of type (). The quantifiers 
,  are type-theoretically polymorphous functions of type (()), for an arbitrary type , 
defined as follows. The universal quantifier  is a function that associates a class A of -
elements with T if A contains all elements of the type , otherwise with F. The existential 
quantifier  is a function that associates a class A of -elements with T if A is a non-empty 
class, otherwise with F. Another kind of partial polymorphic function we need is the 
Singularizer I of type (()). A singularizer is a function that associates a singleton S with 
the only member of S, and is otherwise (i.e. if S is an empty set or a multi-element set) 
undefined.  
Below all type indications will be provided outside the formulae in order not to clutter the 
notation. Furthermore, ‘X/’ means that an object X is (a member) of type . ‘X v ’ 
means that the type of the object v-constructed by X is . We write ‘X  ’ if what is v-
constructed does not depend on a valuation v. This holds throughout: w v  and t v . If 
C v  then the frequently used Composition [[C w] t], which is the intensional descent 
(a.k.a. extensionalization) of the -intension v-constructed by C, will be encoded as ‘Cwt’. 
When using constructions of truth-functions, we often omit Trivialisation and use infix 
notation to conform to standard notation in the interest of better readability. Also when 
using constructions of identities of -entities, =/(), we omit Trivialization, the type 
subscript, and use infix notion when no confusion can arise. For instance, instead of 
‘[0 [0= a b] [0=(()) wt [Pwt a] wt [Pwt b]]]’ 
where =/() is the identity of individuals and =(())/() the identity of propositions; 
a, b constructing objects of type , P objects of type (), we write 
‘[[a = b]  [wt [Pwt  a] = wt [Pwt b]]]’. 
We invariably furnish expressions with procedural structured meanings, which are 
explicated as TIL constructions. The analysis of an unambiguous sentence thus consists in 
discovering the logical construction encoded by a given sentence. The TIL method of analysis 
consists of three steps: 
1. Type-theoretical analysis, i.e., assigning types to the objects that receive mention in the 
analysed sentence.  
2. Type-theoretical synthesis, i.e., combining the constructions of the objects ad (1) in order to 
construct the proposition of type  denoted by the whole sentence.  
3. Type-theoretical checking, i.e. checking whether the proposed analysans is type-
theoretically coherent. 
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To illustrate the method, we analyse the notorious sentence “The King of France is bald” in 
the Strawsonian way. The sentence talks about the office of the King of France (topic) 
ascribing to the individual (if any) that occupies this office the property of being bald 
(focus). Thus it is presupposed that the King of France exist, i.e., that the office be occupied. 
If it is not, then the proposition denoted by the sentence has no truth-value.17 This fact has to 
be revealed by our analysis. Here is how. 
Ad (1) King_of/(): an empirical function that dependently on w, t-pairs assigns to one 
individual (a country) another individual (its king); France/; King_of_France/; 
Bald/(). 
Ad (2) and (3). For the sake of simplicity, I will demonstrate the steps (2) and (3) 
simultaneously. In the second step we combine the constructions of the objects ad (1) in 
order to construct the proposition (of type ) denoted by the whole sentence. Since we 
intend to arrive at the literal analysis of the sentence, the objects denoted by the 
semantically simple expressions are constructed by their Trivialisations: 0King_of, 0France, 
0Bald. In order to construct the office King_of_France, we have to combine 0King_of and 
0France. The function King_of must be extensionalised first via the Composition 0King_ofwt 
v (), and the result is then applied to France; we get [0King_ofwt 0France] v . 
Abstracting over the values of w and t we obtain the Closure that constructs the office: 
wt [0King_ofwt 0France]  . But the property of being bald cannot be ascribed to an 
individual office. Rather, it is ascribed to the individual (if any) occupying the office. Thus 
the office has to be subjected to intensional descent first: wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt v . 
The property itself has to be extensionalised as well: 0Baldwt. By Composing these two 
constructions, we obtain either a truth-value (T or F) or nothing, according as the King of 
France is, or is not, bald, or does not exist, respectively. Finally, by abstracting over the 
values of the variables w and t, we construct the proposition: 
wt [0Baldwt wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt] 
Gloss. In any world (w) at any time (t) do this. First, find out who is the King of France: 
[0King_ofwt 0France]. If there is none, then terminate with a truth-value gap because the 
Composition [0King_ofwt 0France] is v-improper. Otherwise, check whether the so obtained 
individual has the property of being bald: [0Baldwt [0King_ofwt 0France]]. If he is, then T, 
otherwise F. So much for the method of analysis and the semantic schema of the logic of TIL. 
4. Definite descriptions: Strawsonian or Russellian? 
Now I am going to propose a solution to the Strawson-Russell standoff. In other words, I am 
going to analyse the phenomena of presupposition and entailment connected with using 
definite descriptions with supposition de dicto or de re, and I will show how the topic-focus 
distinction determines which of the two cases applies. 
                                                 
17 On our approach this does not mean that the sentence is meaningless. The sentence has a sense, 
namely an instruction of how to evaluate in any possible world w at any time t its truth-conditions. 
(Such instructions are encoded in our language of constructions.) Only if we evaluate these conditions 
in such a state-of-affairs where there is no King of France does the process of evaluation yield a truth-
value gap.  
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4.1 Topic-focus ambiguity 
When used in a communicative act, a sentence communicates something (the focus F) about 
something (the topic T). Thus the schematic structure of a sentence is F(T). The topic T of a 
sentence S is often associated with a presupposition P of S such that P is entailed both by S 
and non-S. On the other hand, the clause in the focus usually occasions a mere entailment of 
some P by S. To give an example, consider the sentence “Our defeat was caused by John”.18 
There are two possible readings of this sentence. Taken one way, the sentence is about our 
defeat, conveying the snippet of information that it was caused by John. In such a situation 
the sentence is associated with the presupposition that we were defeated. Indeed, the 
negated form of the sentence, “Our defeat was not caused by John”, also implies that we 
were defeated. Thus ‘our defeat’ is the topic and ‘was caused by John’ the focus clause. 
Taken the other way, the sentence is about the topic John, ascribing to him the property that 
he caused our defeat (focus). Now the scenario of truly asserting the negated sentence can 
be, for instance, the following. Though it is true that John has a reputation for being rather a 
bad player, Paul was in excellent shape and so we won. Or, another scenario is thinkable. 
We were defeated, only not because of John but because the whole team performed badly. 
Hence, our being defeated is not presupposed by this reading, it is only entailed. 
Schematically, if ╞ is the relation of entailment, then the logical difference between a mere 
entailment and a presupposition is this: 
P is a presupposition of S: (S╞ P)  and (non-S╞ P) 
 Corollary: If P is not true, then neither S nor non-S is true. Hence, S has no truth-value. 
P is only entailed by S: (S╞ P) and neither (non-S╞ P) nor (non-S╞ non-P)   
 Corollary: If S is not true, then we cannot deduce anything about the truth-value of P. 
More precisely, the entailment relation obtains between hyperpropositions P, S; i.e., the 
meaning of P is analytically entailed or presupposed by the meaning of S. Thus ╞/((nn) is 
defined as follows. Let CS, CP be constructions assigned to sentences S, P, respectively, as 
their meanings. Then S entails P (CS╞ CP) iff the following holds:19  
wt [[0Truewt CS] [0Truewt CP]] 
Since we work with properly partial functions, we need to apply the propositional property 
True/(), which returns T for those w, t-pairs at which the argument proposition is 
true, and F in all the remaining cases. There are two other propositional properties: False and 
Undef, both of type (). The three properties are defined as follows. Let P be a 
propositional construction (P/n  ). Then  
[0Truewt P] v-constructs the truth-value T iff Pwt  v-constructs T, otherwise F. 
[0Falsewt P] v-constructs the truth-value T iff [Pwt] v-constructs T, otherwise F. 
[0Undefwt P] v-constructs the truth-value T iff  
[[0Truewt P]  [0Falsewt P]] v-constructs T, otherwise F.  
                                                 
18 This and some other examples were taken from Hajičová (2008). 
19 For the general definition of entailment and the difference between analytical and logical entailment, 
see (Duží 2010).  
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Thus we have: 
[0Undefwt P] = [[0Truewt P] [0Falsewt P]] 
[0Truewt P] = [[0Falsewt P] [0Undefwt P]] 
[0Falsewt P] = [[0Truewt P] [0Undefwt P]] 
Hence, though we work with truth-value gaps, we do not work with a third truth-value, 
and our logic is in this weak sense bivalent.  
4.2 The King of France revisited 
Above we analysed the sentence “The King of France is bald” on its perhaps most natural 
reading as predicating the property of being bald (the focus) of the individual (if any) that is 
the present King of France (the topic). Yet there is another, albeit less natural reading of the 
sentence. Imagine that the sentence is uttered in a situation when we are talking about 
baldness, and somebody asks “Who is bald?” The answer might be “Well, among those who 
are bald there is the present King of France”. If you got such an answer, you would most 
probably protest, “This cannot be true, for there is no King of France now”. On such a 
reading the sentence is about baldness (topic) claiming that this property is instantiated, 
among others, by the King of France (focus). Since there are no rigorous grammatical rules 
in English to distinguish between the two variants, the input of our logical analysis is the 
result of a linguistic analysis, where the topic and focus of a sentence are made explicit.20 In 
this chapter I will mark the topic clause in italics. The two readings of the above sentence 
are: 
(S) “The King of France is bald”   (Strawsonian) and  
(R)  “The King of France is bald” (Russellian). 
The analysis of (S) is as above:  
wt [0Baldwt wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt] 
The meaning of ‘the King of France’, viz. wt [0King_ofwt 0France], occurs in (S) with de re 
supposition, because the object of predication is the unique value in a w, t-pair of 
evaluation of the office rather than the office itself.21 The following two de re principles are 
satisfied: the principle of existential presupposition and the principle of substitution of co-
referential expressions. Thus the following arguments are valid (though not sound):   
The King of France is/is not bald 
The King of France exists 
                                                 
20 For instance, the Prague linguistic school created The Prague Dependency Treebank for the Czech 
language, which contains a large amount of Czech texts with complex and interlink annotation on 
different levels. The tectogrammatical representation contains the semantic structure of sentences with 
topic-focus annotators.  For details, see http://ufal.mff.cuni.cz/pdt2.0/.  
21 For details on de dicto vs. de re supposition, see (Duží et al., 2010a), esp. §§ 1.5.2 and 2.6.2, and also 
(Duží 2004).  
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The King of France is bald 
The King of France is Louis XVI 
Louis XVI is bald 
Here are the proofs. 
(a) existential presupposition: 
First, existence is here a property of an individual office rather than of some non-existing 
individual (whatever it might mean for an individual not to exist). Thus we have 
Exist/(). To prove the validity of the first argument, we define Exist/() as the 
property of an office’s being occupied at a given world/time pair: 
0Exist =of wt c [0x [x =i cwt]],  
i.e. [0Existwt c] =o [0x [x =i cwt]] 
Types: /(()): the class of non-empty classes of individuals; c v ; x v ; =o/(): the 
identity of truth-values; =of /(()()): the identity of properties of individual offices; 
=i/(): the identity of individuals, x v . Now let Louis/, Empty/(()) the singleton 
containing the empty set of individuals, and Improper/(1) the property of constructions 
of being v-improper at a given w, t-pair, the other types as above. Then at any w, t-pair 
the following proof steps are truth-preserving:  
1) ()[0Baldwt wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt]  Ø 
2) [0Improperwt 0[wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt]]  by Def. 2, iii) 
3) [0Empty x [x =i [wt [0King_ofwt 0France]]wt]]  from (2) by Def. 2, iv) 
4) [0x [x =i [wt [0King_ofwt 0France]]wt]]  EG 
7) [0Existwt [wt [0King_ofwt 0France]]]   by def. of Exist. 
(b) substitution: 
1) [0Baldwt wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt]   Ø 
2) [0Louis =i wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt]  Ø 
3) [0Baldwt 0Louis]     substitution of identicals 
As explained above, the sentence (R) is not associated with the presupposition that the 
present King of France exist, because ‘the King of France’ occurs now in the focus clause. 
The truth-conditions of the Russellian “The King of France is bald” are these: 
 True, if among those who are bald there is the King of France 
 False, if among those who are bald there is no King of France (either because the 
present King of France does not exist or because the King of France is not bald). 
Thus the two readings (S) and (R) have different truth-conditions, and they are not equivalent, 
albeit they are co-entailing. The reason is this. Trivially, a valid argument is truth-preserving 
from premises to conclusion. However, due to partiality, the entailment relation may fail to be 
falsity-preserving from conclusion to premises. As a consequence, if A, B are constructions of 
propositions such that A╞ B and B╞ A, then A, B are not necessarily equivalent in the sense of 
constructing the same proposition. The propositions they construct may not be identical, 
though the propositions take the truth-value T at exactly the same world/times, because they 
may differ in such a way that at some w, t-pair(s) one takes the value F while the other is 
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undefined. The pair of meanings of (S) and (R) is an example of such co-entailing, yet non-
equivalent hyperpropositions. If the value of the proposition constructed by the meaning of (S) 
is T then so is the value of the proposition constructed by the meaning of (R), and vice versa. 
But, for instance, in the actual world now the proposition constructed by (S) has no truth-value 
whereas the proposition constructed by (R) takes value F. 
Now I am going to analyse (R). Russell argued for his theory in (1905, p. 3): 
The evidence for the above theory is derived from the difficulties which seem 
unavoidable if we regard denoting phrases as standing for genuine constituents of 
the propositions in whose verbal expressions they occur. Of the possible theories 
which admit such constituents the simplest is that of Meinong. This theory regards 
any grammatically correct denoting phrase as standing for an object. Thus ‘the 
present King of France’, ‘the round square’, etc., are supposed to be genuine objects. It 
is admitted that such objects do not subsist, but nevertheless they are supposed to be 
objects. This is in itself a difficult view; but the chief objection is that such objects, 
admittedly, are apt to infringe the law of contradiction. It is contended, for example, 
that the existent present King of France exists, and also does not exist; that the round 
square is round, and also not round, etc. But this is intolerable; and if any theory can 
be found to avoid this result, it is surely to be preferred. 
We have such a theory at hand, viz. TIL. Moreover, TIL makes it possible to avoid the other 
objections against Russell’s analysis as well. Russellian rephrasing of the sentence “The King 
of France is bald” is this: ”There is a unique individual such that he is the King of France and 
he is bald”. This sentence expresses the construction 
(R*) wt [0x [x =i [wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt]  [0Baldwt x]]].22 
TIL analysis of the ‘Russellian rephrasing’ does not deprive ‘the King of France’ of its 
meaning. The meaning is invariably, in all contexts, the Closure wt [0King_ofwt 0France]. 
Thus the second objection to the Russellian analysis is not pertinent here. Moreover, even 
the third objection is irrelevant, because in (R*) wt [0King_ofwt 0France] occurs intensionally 
unlike in the analysis of (S) where it occurs extensionally.23 The existential quantifier  
applies to sets of individuals rather than a particular individual. The proposition constructed 
by (R*) is true if the set of individuals who are bald contains the individual who occupies the 
office of King of France, otherwise it is simply false. The truth conditions specified by (R*) 
are Russellian. Thus we might be content with (R*) as an adequate analysis of the Russellian 
reading (R). Yet we should not be. The reason is this. Russell’s analysis has another defect; it 
does not comply with Carnap’s principle of subject-matter, which states, roughly, that only 
those entities that receive mention in a sentence can become constituents of its meaning.24 In 
                                                 
22 Note that in TIL we do not need the construction corresponding to y (Fy  x=y) specifying the 
uniqueness of the King of France, because it is inherent in the meaning of ‘the King of France’.  This 
holds also in a language like Czech, which lacks grammatical articles. The meaning of descriptions ‘the 
King of France’, ‘král Francie’ is a construction of an individual office of type  occupied in each w, t-
pair by at most one individual.  
23 For the definition of extensional, intensional and hyperintensional occurrence of a construction, see 
(Duží et al., 2010a, § 2.6).  
24 See (Carnap 1947, §24.2, §26). 
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other words, (R*) is not the literal analysis of the sentence “The King of France is bald”., 
because existence and conjunction do not receive mention in the sentence. Russell did avoid 
the intolerable result that the King of France both does and does not exist, but the price he 
paid is too high, because his rephrasing of the sentence is too loose a reformulation of it. TIL, 
as a hyperintensional, typed partial -calculus, is in a much better position to solve the 
problem.  
From the logical point of view, the two readings differ in the way their respective negated 
form is obtained. Whereas the Stawsonian negated form is “The King of France is not bald”, 
which obviously lacks a truth-value if the King of France does not exist, the Russellian 
negated form is “It is not true that the King of France is bald”, which is true at those w, t-
pairs where the office is not occupied. Thus in the Strawsonian case the property of not 
being bald is ascribed to the individual, if any, that occupies the royal office. The meaning 
of ‘the King of France’ occurs with de re supposition, as we have seen above. On the other 
hand, in the Russellian case the property of not being true is ascribed to the whole 
proposition that the King is bald, and thus (the same meaning of) the description ‘the 
King of France’ occurs with de dicto supposition. Hence we simply ascribe the property of 
being  or not being true to the whole proposition. To this end we apply the propositional 
property True/() defined above. Now the analysis of the sentence (R) is this 
construction: 
(R’)  wt [0Truewt wt [0Baldwt wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt]] 
Neither (R’) nor its negation   
(R’_neg)  wt [0Truewt wt [0Baldwt wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt]] 
entail that the King of France exists, which is just as it should be. (R’_neg) constructs the 
proposition non-P that takes the truth-value T if the proposition that the King of France is 
bald takes the value F (because the King of France is not bald) or is undefined (because the 
King of France does not exist).  
Consider now another group of sample sentences:   
(1)  “The King of France visited London yesterday.” 
(1’) “The King of France did not visit London yesterday.”  
The sentences (1) and (1’) talk about the (actual and current) King of France (the topic), 
ascribing to him the property of (not) having visited London yesterday (the focus). Thus 
both sentences share the presupposition that the King of France actually exist now. If this 
presupposition fails to be satisfied, then neither of the propositions expressed by (1) and (1’) 
has a truth-value. The situation is different in the case of sentences (2) and (2’): 
(2)  “London was visited by the King of France yesterday.”  
(2’)  “London was not visited by the King of France yesterday.” 
Now the property (the focus) of having been visited by the King of France yesterday is 
predicated of London (the topic). The existence of the King of France (now) is presupposed 
neither by (2) nor by (2’). The sentences can be read as “Among the visitors of London 
yesterday was (not) the King of France”. The existence of the King of France yesterday is only 
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entailed by (2) and not presupposed.25 Our analyses respect these conditions. Let 
Yesterday/(()) be the function that associates a given time t with the time interval that is 
yesterday with respect to t; Visit/(); King_of/(); France/; /(()): the existential 
quantifier that assigns to a given set of times the truth-value T if the set is non-empty, 
otherwise F. In what follows I will use an abbreviated notation without Trivialisation, 
writing ‘x A’ instead of  ‘[0x A]’, when no confusion can arise. The analyses of sentences 
(1), (1’) come down to  
(1*)     wt [x t’[[[0Yesterday t] t’]  [0Visitwt’ x 0London]] wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt] 
(1’*)   wt [x [t’[[[0Yesterday t] t’]  [0Visitwt’ x  0London]] wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt] 
At such a w, t-pair at which the King of France does not exist neither of the propositions 
constructed by (1*) and (1’*) has a truth-value, because the extensionalization of the office 
yields no individual, the Composition wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt being v-improper. We have 
the Strawsonian case, the meaning of ‘King of France’ occurring with de re supposition, and 
the King’s existence being presupposed. On the other hand, the sentences (2), (2’) express   
(2*) wt t’[[[0Yesterday t] t’]  [0Visitwt’ wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt’ 0London]] 
(2’*) wt t’[[[0Yesterday t] t’]  [0Visitwt’ wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt’ 0London]] 
At such a w, t-pair at which the proposition constructed by (2*) is true, the Composition 
t’[[[0Yesterday t] t’]  wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt’ 0London]] v-constructs T. This means that 
the second conjunct v-constructs T as well and the Composition wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt’ 
is not v-improper. Thus the King of France existed at some time t’ belonging to yesterday. On 
the other hand, if the King of France did not exist at any time yesterday, then the 
Composition wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt’ is v-improper for any t’ belonging to yesterday and 
the time interval v-constructed by t’[[[0Yesterday t] t’]  [0Visitwt’ wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt’ 
0London]], as well as  by t’[[[0Yesterday t] t’]  [0Visitwt’ wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt’ 
0London]], is empty. The existential quantifier takes this interval to F. This is as it should be, 
because (2*) only implies the existence of the King of France yesterday but does not presuppose it. 
We have the Russellian case. The meaning of the definite description ‘the King of France’ 
occurs with de dicto supposition in (2) and (2’).26   
5. Topic-focus ambivalence in general 
Up until now we have utilised the singularity of definite descriptions like ‘the King of 
France’ that denote functions of type . If the King of France does not exist in some 
particular world W at some particular time T, the office is not occupied and the function 
does not have a value at W, T. Due to the partiality of the office constructed by wt 
[0King_ofwt 0France] and the principle of compositionality, the respective analyses construct 
purely partial propositions associated with some presupposition, as desired. Now I am 
going to generalize the topic-focus phenomenon to sentences containing general terms.  
                                                 
25 Von Fintel (2004) does not take into account this reading and says that any sentence containing ‘the 
King of France’ comes with the presupposition that the King of France exist now. In my opinion, this is 
because he considers only the neutral reading, thus rejecting topic-focus ambiguities.   
26 More precisely, the meaning of ‘the King of France’ occurs with de dicto supposition with respect to 
the temporal parameter t.  
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To get started, let us analyse Strawson’s example  
(3)  “All John‘s children are asleep.”  
(3‘)  “All John‘s children are not asleep.”   
According to Strawson both (1) and (1’) entail27  
(4) John has children.  
In other words, (4) is a presupposition of (3) and (3’). If each of John’s children is asleep, 
then (3) is true and (3’) false. If each of John’s children is not asleep, then (3) is false and (3’) 
is true. However, if John has no children, then (3) and (3’) are neither true nor false. Note 
that applying a classical regimentation of (3) in the language of the first-order predicate 
logic (FOL), we get  
“x [JC(x)  S(x)]” 
This formula is true under every interpretation assigning an empty set of individuals to the 
predicate JC (‘is a child of John’s’). In other words, FOL does not make it possible to render 
the truth-conditions of a sentence equipped with a presupposition, because FOL is a logic of 
total functions. We need to apply a richer logical system in order to express the instruction 
how to evaluate the truth-conditions of (3) in the way described above. By reformulating the 
above specification of the truth-conditions of (3) in a rather technical jargon of English, we 
get  
“If John has children then check whether all his children are asleep,  
else fail to produce a truth-value.” 
We now analyse the particular constituents of this instruction. As always, we start with 
assigning types to the objects that receive mention in the sentence: Child_of(()): an 
empirical function that dependently on states-of-affairs assigns to an individual a set of 
individuals, its children; John/; Sleep/(); /(()); All/((())()): a restricted general 
quantifier that assigns to a given set the set of all its supersets. 
The presupposition that John have children receives the analysis  
wt [0x [[0Child_ofwt 0John] x]]. 
Now the literal analysis of the sentence “All John’s children are asleep” on its neutral 
reading (that is, without existential presupposition), is best obtained by using the restricted 
quantifier All, because using a general quantifier  would involve implication that does not 
receive mention in the sentence. Composing the quantifier with the set of John’s children at 
the world/time pair of evaluation, [0All [0Child_ofwt 0John]], we obtain the set of all supersets 
of John’s children in w at t. The sentence claims that the population of those who are asleep, 
0Sleepwt, is one such superset:  
wt [[0All [0Child_ofwt 0John]] 0Sleepwt]. 
The schematic analysis of sentence (3) on its topic-like reading that comes with the 
presupposition that John have children translates into this procedure: 
                                                 
27 See (Strawson, 1952, in particular pp. 173ff.) 
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(3s) wt [If [0x [[0Child_ofwt 0John] x]] then [[0All [0Child_ofwt 0John]] 0Sleepwt] else Fail. 
To finish the analysis, we must define the if-then-else function. This I am going to do in the 
next paragraph.  
5.1 The if-then-else function  
In a programming language the if-then-else conditional forces a program to perform different 
actions depending on whether the specified condition evaluates true or else false. This is 
always achieved by selectively altering the control flow based on the specified condition. For 
this reason, an analysis in terms of material implication, , or even ‘exclusive or’ as known 
from propositional logic, is not adequate. The reason is this. Since propositional logic is 
strictly compositional, both the ‘then clause’ and the ‘else clause’ are always evaluated. For 
instance, it might seem that the instruction expressed by “The only number n such that if 5 = 
5 then n equals 1, else n equals the result of 1 divided by 0” would receive the analysis  
[0I n [[[05=05]  [n=01]]  [[05=05]  [n=[0Div 01 00]]]]] 
Types: I/(()); n v ; 0, 1, 5/; Div/(): the division function. 
But the output of the above procedure should be the number 1 because the else clause is 
never executed. However, due to the strict principle of compositionality that TIL observes, 
the above analysis fails to produce anything, the construction being improper. For, the 
Composition [0Div 01 00] does not produce anything: it is improper because the division 
function takes no value at the argument 1, 0. Thus [n = [0Div 01 00]] is v-improper for any 
valuation v, because the identity relation = does not receive a second argument, and so any 
other Composition containing the improper Composition [0Div 01 00] as a constituent also 
comes out v-improper. The underlying principle is that partiality is being strictly 
propagated up. This is the reason why the if-then-else connective is often said to denote a 
non-strict function not complying with the principle of compositionality. However, as I wish 
to argue, there is no cogent reason to settle for non-compositionality. I suggest applying a 
mechanism known in computer science as lazy evaluation. As we have seen, the procedural 
semantics of TIL operates smoothly even at the hyperintensional level of constructions. Thus 
it enables us to specify a definition of if-then-else that meets the compositionality constraint. 
The analysis of  
“If P then C, else D” 
reveals a procedure that decomposes into two phases. First, on the basis of the condition P, 
select one of C, D as the procedure to be executed. Second, execute the selected procedure. 
The first phase, viz. selection, is realized by the Composition  
[0I* c [[P  [c = 0C]]  [P  [c = 0D]]]] 
Types: P v  (the condition of the choice between the execution of C or of D); C, D/n; 
variable c v n; I*/(n(n)): the singularizer.   
The Composition [[P  [c=0C]]  [P  [c=0D]]] v-constructs T in two cases. If P v-constructs 
T then the variable c receives as its value the construction C, and if P v-constructs F then the 
variable c receives the construction D as its value. In either case the set v-constructed by  
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c [[P  [c=0C]]  [P  [c=0D]]] is a singleton whose element is a construction. Applying I* 
to this set returns as its value the only member of the set, i.e. either C or D.28  
Second, the chosen construction c is executed. To execute it we apply Double Execution; see 
Def. 2, vi). As a result, the schematic analysis of “If P then C, else D” turns out to be 
(*) 2[0I* c [[P  [c=0C]]  [P  [c=0D]]]] 
Note that the evaluation of the first phase does not involve the execution of either of C or D. 
In this phase these constructions figure only as arguments of other functions. In other 
words, we operate at hyperintensional level. The second phase of execution turns the level 
down to intensional or extensional one. Thus we define: 
Definition 4 (If-then-else, if-then-else-fail). Let p/n v ; c, d1, d2/n+1  n; 2c, 2d1, 2d2 v . 
Then the polymorphic functions if-then-else and if-then-else-fail of types (nn), (n), 
respectively, are defined as follows:  
0If-then-else = p d1 d2 2[0I* c [[p  [c = d1]]  [p  [c = d2]]]] 
0If-then-else-fail = p d1 2[0I* c [[p  [c = d1]]  [p  0F]]] 
Now we are ready to specify a general analytic schema of an (empirical) sentence S 
associated with a presupposition P. In a technical jargon of English the evaluation 
instruction can be formulated as follows:   
At any w, t-pair do this:  
if Pwt is true then evaluate Swt, else Fail (to produce a truth-value). 
Let P/n   be a construction of a presupposition, S/n   the meaning of the sentence 
S and c/n+1 v n a variable.  Then the corresponding TIL construction is this: 
wt [0If-then-else-fail Pwt 0Swt] = 
wt 2[0I*c [[Pwt  [c =  0Swt]]  [Pwt  0F]]] 
The evaluation of S for any w, t-pair depends on whether the presupposition P is true at 
w, t. If true, the singleton v-constructed by c [ … ] contains as the only construction to be 
executed 0Swt that is afterwards double executed. The first execution produces Swt and the 
second execution produces a truth-value. If Pwt v-constructs T, then the second conjunct 
becomes the Composition [0T  0F] and thus we get c 0F. The v-constructed set is empty. 
Hence, [I*c 0F] is v-improper, and the Double Execution fails to produce a truth-value.  
Now we can finish the analysis of Strason’s example (3). First, make a choice between 
executing the Composition [[0All [0Child_ofwt 0John]] 0Sleepwt] and a v-improper construction 
that fails to produce a truth-value. If the Composition [0x [[0Child_ofwt 0John] x]] v-
constructs T then the former, else the latter. The choice itself is realized by this Composition: 
[0I*c [[x [[0Child_ofwt 0John] x]  [c=0[[0All [0Child_ofwt 0John]] 0Sleepwt]]] 
  [x [[0Child_ofwt 0John] x]  0F]]] 
                                                 
28 In case P is v-improper the singleton is empty and no construction is selected to be executed so the 
execution aborts.  
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Second, execute the chosen construction. To this end we apply Double Execution:  
2[0I*c [[x [[0Child_ofwt 0John] x]  [c=0[[0All [0Child_ofwt 0John]] 0Sleepwt]]] 
  [x [[0Child_ofwt 0John] x]  0F]]] 
The evaluation of this construction for any w, t depends on whether the presupposition 
condition x [[0Child_ofwt 0John] x] is true at w, t:      
a. x [[0Child_ofwt 0John] x] v T.  
Then c [0T  [c=0[[0All [0Child_ofwt 0John]] 0Sleepwt]  [0F  0F]] v-constructs this 
singleton: {0[[0All [0Child_ofwt 0John]] 0Sleepwt]}. Hence the value of I* is its only 
member and we have: 
2[0I* c [0T  [c=0[[0All [0Child_ofwt 0John]] 0Sleepwt]  [0F  0F]] = 
20[[0All [0Child_ofwt 0John]] 0Sleepwt] = [[0All [0Child_ofwt 0John]] 0Sleepwt].  
b. x [[0Child_ofwt 0John] x] v F.  
Then c [0F  [c=0[[0All [0Child_ofwt 0John]] 0Sleepwt]  [0T  0F]] = c 0F. The v-
constructed set is empty, function I* being undefined at such set. Hence, 2[0I*c 0F] is 
v-improper, fails.   
Finally, we must abstract over the values of w and t in order to construct a proposition of 
type  denoted by the sentence. The resulting analysis of (3) is this:  
(3*) wt 2[0I*c [x [[0Child_ofwt 0John] x]  [c=0[[0All [0Child_ofwt 0John]] 0Sleepwt] 
  [x [[0Child_ofwt 0John] x]  0F]]] 
In the interest of better readability I will in the remainder use a more standard notation. 
Hence instead of either “wt [0If-then-else-fail Pwt 0Swt]” or “wt 2[0I*c [[Pwt  [c = 0Swt]]  
[Pwt  0F]]]” I will simply write “wt [If Pwt then Swt else Fail]”.  
5.2 Additional examples 
Consider now another pair of sentences differing only in terms of topic-focus articulation:  
(4)  “The global financial and economic crisis was caused by the Bank of America.” 
(5)  “The Bank of America caused the global financial and economic crisis.” 
While (4) not only entails but also presupposes that there be a global financial and economic 
crisis, the truth-conditions of (5) are different, as our analysis clarifies. First, (4) as well as  
(4’)  “The global financial and economic crisis was not caused by Bank of America” 
are about the global crisis, and that there is such a crisis is not only entailed but also 
presupposed by both sentences. The instruction encoded by (4) formulated in logician’s 
English is this:  
“If there is a global crisis then return T or F according as the crisis was caused  
by the Bank of America, else fail (to produce a truth-value)” 
Since every TIL analysis is fully compositional, we first need to analyse the particular 
constituents of this instruction, and then combine these constituents into the construction 
expressed by the sentence. As always, we start with assigning types to the objects that 
receive mention in the sentence. Simplifying a bit, let the objects be: Crisis/: the 
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proposition that there is a global financial and economic crisis; Cause/(): the relation-
in-intension between an individual and a proposition which has been caused to be true by 
the individual; Bank_of_America/: the individual office occupiable by a corporation 
belonging to the American financial institutions. 
A schematic analysis of (4) comes down to this procedure:  
wt [If 0Crisiswt then [0Truewt wt [0Causewt 0Bank_of_Americawt 0Crisis]] else Fail] 
Here we are again using the propositional property True in the then-clause, because this 
clause occurs in the focus of the sentence, and thus with de dicto supposition. The existence 
of the Bank of America is not presupposed.   
The truth-conditions of the other reading with ‘Bank of America’ as topic are different. Now 
the sentence (5) is about the Bank of America (topic), ascribing to this corporation the 
property that it caused the crisis (focus). Thus the scenario of truly asserting that (5) is not 
true can be, for instance, this. Though it is true that the Bank of America played a major role 
in risky investments in China, the President of USA played a positive role in enhancing 
financial-market transparency and passed new laws that prevented a global crisis from 
arising. Or, a less optimistic scenario is thinkable. The global financial and economic crisis is 
not due to the Bank of America’s bad investments but because in the era of globalisation the 
market economy is unpredictable, hence uncontrollable. Hence, that there is a crisis is not 
presupposed by (5), and its analysis is this Closure: 
wt [If [0Existwt 0Bank_of_America] then [0Truewt wt [0Causewt 0Bank_of_Americawt 0Crisis]] 
else Fail] 
Note that (5) presupposes the existence of the Bank of America, while the existence of the 
crisis is not presupposed. Yet, if (5) is true, then the existence of the crisis can be validly 
inferred. To capture such truth-conditions, we need to refine the analysis. A plausible 
explication of this phenomenon is this: x is a cause of a proposition p iff p is true and if it is 
so then x affected p so as to become true. Schematically,   
wt [0Causewt x p] = wt [pwt  [pwt   [0Affectwt x p]]] 
Types: Cause, Affect/(); x  , : any type; p  . 
If x is not a cause of p, then either p is not true or p is true but x did not affect p so as to 
become true: wt [0Causewt x p] = wt [pwt  [pwt  [0Affectwt x p]]].29 By applying such 
an explication to our sentence, the construction corresponding to the ‘then clause’, viz. wt 
[0Causewt 0Bank_of_Americawt 0Crisis], is refined to: 
wt [0Crisiswt [0Crisiswt [0Affectwt 0Bank_of_Americawt 0Crisis]]] 
This Closure entails that there is a crisis, which is the desired (logical, though not economic) 
outcome.   
The topic-focus ambiguity also crops up in the case of propositional and notional attitudes, 
as noted in the Introduction.30 Imagine one is referring to the tragedy in Dallas, November 
                                                 
29 For the sake of simplicity, I ignore here the past tense ‘affected’; a more precise analysis is this:  
wt [pwt  [pwt   t’ [[t’ < t]  [0Affectwt’ x p]]]].  
30 For an analysis of propositional attidues de dicto and de re, see (Duží et al., 2010a, § 5.1.2). 
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22, 1963, by “The police were seeking the murderer of JFK, but never found him”. The 
sentence is again ambiguous due to a difference in topic-focus articulation, as evidenced by 
(6) and (7):  
(6) The police were seeking the murderer of JFK, but never found him. 
(7) The police were seeking the murderer of JFK, but never found him. 
The existence of the murderer of JFK is not presupposed by (6), unlike (7). The sentence (6) 
can be true in such states-of-affairs where JFK was not murdered, unlike (7). The latter can 
be reformulated in a less ambiguous way as “The murderer of JFK was looked for by the 
police, but was never found”. This sentence expresses the construction  
wt [If [0Existwt wt [0Murderer_ofwt 0JFK] then  
[[0Seekwt 0Police wt [0Murderer_ofwt 0JFK]]  [0Findwt 0Police wt [0Murderer_ofwt 0JFK]]] 
else Fail. 
Types: Seek, Find/(): the relation-in-intension between an individual and an individual 
office (the seeker wants to find out who is the holder of the office); Police/; 
Murderer_of/(); JFK/.31  
On the other hand, the analysis of (6) comes down to this construction: 
wt [[0Seekwt 0Police [wt [0Murderer_ofwt 0JFK]]]   
[0Findwt 0Police [wt [0Murderer_ofwt 0JFK]]]]. 
If the police did not find the murderer then either the murderer did not exist or the 
murderer did exist; only the search was not successful. However, if the foregoing search was 
successful, then it is true that police found the murderer and the murderer exists. Hence, a 
successful search, i.e. finding after a foregoing search, merely entails that the murderer exists 
and the following argument is valid:  
wt [0Findwt 0Police [wt [0Murderer_ofwt 0JFK]]] 
 
wt [0Existwt [wt [0Murderer_ofwt 0JFK]]] 
In order to logically reproduce this entailment, we explicate finding after a foregoing search in 
a manner similar to causing (x v ; c v ; Success_Search/()):  
wt [0Findwt  x c] = wt [[0Existwt c]  [[0Existwt c]   [0Success_Searchwt  x c]]]; 
wt [0Findwt x c] = wt [[0Existwt c]  [[0Existwt c]  [0Success_Searchwt  x c]]]. 
Thus the analysis of such an explication of the sentence “The police found the murderer of 
JFK” is this Closure: 
wt [[0Existwt wt [0Murderer_ofwt 0JFK]]  [[0Existwt wt [0Murderer_ofwt 0JFK]]   
[0Success_Searchwt  0Police wt [0Murderer_ofwt 0JFK]]]] 
From this analysis one can validly infer that the murderer exists and that the search was 
successful, just as we ought to be able to. And if the so constructed proposition is not true, 
                                                 
31 For the sake of simplicity, past tense and anaphoric reference are ignored. For a more detailed 
analysis of this kind of seeking and finding, see, for instance, (Duží 2003) or (Duží et al., 2010a, § 5.2.2).  
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then the murderer does not exist or the murder does exist, only the search did not meet with 
success. 
The next example I am going to analyse is again due to (Hajičová, 2008):  
(8) “John only introduced Bill to Sue.” 
(9) “John only introduced Bill to Sue.”   
Leaving aside the possible disambiguation “John introduced only Bill to Sue” vs. “John 
introduced Bill only to Sue”, (8) can be truly affirmed only in a situation where John did not 
introduce other people to Sue than Bill. This is not the case of (9). This sentence can be true 
in a situation where John introduced other people to Sue, but the only person Bill was 
introduced to by John was Sue. Hence the presuppositions of (8) and (9) are constructed by 
these Closures:  
Presupposition of (8): wt [x [[0Int_towt 0John x 0Sue]  [x = 0Bill]]] 
Presupposition of (9): wt [y [[0Int_towt 0John 0Bill y]  [y = 0Sue]]]  
The construction C that is to be executed in case a relevant presupposition is true is here the 
Closure wt [0Int_towt 0John 0Bill 0Sue]. Types: Int_to/(): a relation-in-intension between 
the individual who does the introducing, another individual who is introduced, and yet 
another individual to whom the second individual was introduced; John, Sue, Bill/. 
The resulting analyses are 
(8*) wt [If x [[0Int_towt 0John x 0Sue]  [x = 0Bill]] then [0Int_towt 0John 0Bill 0Sue]  
else fail];  
(9*) wt [If y [[0Int_towt 0John 0Bill y]  [y = 0Sue]] then [0Int_towt 0John 0Bill 0Sue] 
  else fail].  
Using technical jargon, the truth-conditions constructed by the construction (8*) are, “If the 
only person that was introduced by John to Sue is Bill, then it is true that John introduced 
only Bill to Sue, otherwise there is no truth-value”. Similarly for (9*).  
For the last example, consider the sentence  
“All students of VSB-TU Ostrava who signed up for the Logic course   
in the winter term of 2011 passed the final exam.”  
There are again two readings matching two possible scenarios. 
Scenario 1: We are talking about the students of VSB-Technical University Ostrava, and 
somebody then asks, “What about the students of VSB-TU Ostrava who signed up for the 
Logic course in the winter term of 2011 – how did they do?”. The answer is, “They did well, 
they all passed the final exam”.  
In this case the topic of the sentence is the students enrolled in the Logic course. Thus the 
sentence comes with the presupposition that there should be students of VSB-TU Ostrava 
having signed up for Logic in the winter term of 2011. If this presupposition is not satisfied 
(for instance, because the course runs only in the summer term) then the sentence is neither 
true nor false, leaving a truth-value gap. For the negated sentence cannot be true, either: 
“Some students of VSB-TU Ostrava who signed up for Logic in the winter term of 2011 did 
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not pass the final exam”. Moreover, the positive sentence merely entails (and so does not 
presuppose) that the final exam has taken place. This is so because the sentence can be false 
for either of two reasons: Either some of the students did not succeed, or none of the 
students succeeded because the exam has yet to take place. 
Scenario 2: The topic is the final exam. Somebody asks, “What about the final exam in Logic, 
what are the results?” One possible answer is, “All students passed”. Now the sentence 
presupposes that the final exam have already taken place. If it has not then the sentence is 
neither true nor false, because the negated sentence (“The final exam has not been passed by 
all students …”) cannot be true, either. In this situation the (positive) sentence does not 
presuppose, but only entails, that some students signed up for the course.  
The logical machinery of TIL, thanks not least to the application of Definition 4, makes it 
easy to properly distinguish between those two non-equivalent readings. In the situation 
corresponding to the first scenario the meaning of the sentence is this Closure: 
 
wt [If [0 [0Students_enrolled_inwt 0Logic]  
then [[0All [0Students_enrolled_inwt 0Logic]] [0Passedwt 0Exam]  
else Fail] 
The second scenario receives this Closure as analysis: 
wt [If Examwt than [[0All [0Students_enrolled_inwt 0Logic]] [0Passedwt 0Exam]  
else Fail] 
Types: /(()): the existential quantifier; Students_enrolled_in/(()): an attribute (i.e. 
empirical function) that dependently on a given state-of-affairs assigns to an individual a set 
of individuals; Logic/ (for the sake of simplicity); All/((())()):  a restricted quantifier, 
which is a function assigning to a set S of individuals the set of all supersets of S; 
Passed/(()): a function that dependently on a given state-of-affairs associates a 
proposition (in this case an event) with the set of individuals (who are the successful actors 
of the event); Exam/: the proposition that the final exam takes place.32   
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter I brought out the semantic, as opposed to pragmatic, character of the 
ambivalence stemming from topic-focus articulation. The procedural semantics of TIL 
provided rigorous analyses such that sentences differing only in their topic-focus 
articulation were assigned different constructions producing different propositions (truth-
conditions) and having different consequences. I showed that a definite description 
occurring in the topic of a sentence with de re supposition corresponds to the Strawsonian 
analysis of definite descriptions, while a definite description occurring in the focus with de 
dicto supposition corresponds to the Russellian analysis. While the clause standing in topic 
                                                 
32 For the sake of simplicity we are ignoring the past tense of the sentence. For the TIL analysis of tenses, 
see (Duží et al., 2010a, § 2.5.2). Similarly as above, see the sentence (3), we again apply the restricted 
quantifier All in the analysis of the clause “All students who signed up for Logic passed the exam’. 
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position triggers a presupposition, a focus clause usually entails rather than presupposes 
another proposition. Thus both opponents and proponents of Russell’s quantificational 
analysis of definite descriptions are partly right and partly wrong.  
Moreover, the proposed analysis of the Russellian reading does not deprive definite 
descriptions of their meaning. Just the opposite; ‘the F’ receives a context-invariant 
meaning.  What is dependent on context is the way this (one and the same) meaning is 
used. Thus I also demonstrated that Donnellan-style referential and attributive uses of an 
occurrence of ‘the F’ do not bring about a shift of meaning of ‘the F’. Instead, one and the 
same context-invariant meaning is a constituent of different procedures that behave in 
different ways.  
The proposed analysis of topic-focus ambivalence was then generalized to sentences 
containing not only singular clauses like ‘the F’ but also general clauses like ‘John’s 
children’, ‘all students’ in the topic or focus of a sentence. As a result, I proposed a 
general analytic schema for sentences equipped with a presupposition. This analysis 
makes use of the definition of the if-then-else function that complies with the desirable 
principle of compositionality. This is also my novel contribution to the old problem of 
the semantic character of the specification of the if-then-else function. I demonstrated the 
method by analysing several examples including notional attitudes like seeking and 
finding.   
The moral to be drawn from my contribution is this. Logical analysis disambiguates 
ambiguous expressions, but cannot dictate which disambiguation is the intended one 
(leaving room for pragmatics here). Yet, our fine-grained method of analysis contributes to 
language disambiguation by making its hidden features explicit and logically tractable. In case 
there are more senses of a sentence we furnish the sentence with different TIL logical forms. 
Having a formal, fine-grained encoding of linguistic senses at our disposal, we are in a 
position to automatically infer the relevant consequences. 
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